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ABSTRACT
There have been recent policy moves aimed at encouraging individuals to
lead healthier lives. The Cabinet Office has set up a ‘nudge unit’ with
health as one of its priorities and behavioural approaches have started
to be integrated into health-related domestic policy in a number of
areas. Behavioural research has shown that that the way the environment
is constructed can shape a person’s choices within it.Thus, it is hoped that,
by using insights from such research, people can be nudged towards
making decisions which are better for their health. This article outlines
how nudges can be conceived of as part of an expanding arsenal of
health-affecting regulatory tools being used by the Government and
addresses some concerns which have been expressed regarding behaviour-
al research-driven regulation and policy. In particular, it makes the case
that, regardless of new regulatory and policy strategies, we cannot
escape the myriad of influences which surround us. As such, we can
view our health-affecting decisions as already being in some sense
shaped and constructed. Further, it argues we may in fact have reason to
prefer sets of health-affecting options which have been intentionally
designed by the state, rather than those that stem from other sources or
result from random processes. Even so, in closing, this article draws atten-
tion to the largely unanswered questions about how behavioural research
translates into policy and regulatory initiatives.
I. INTRODUCTION
There have been recent moves in policy circles to embrace a host of strat-
egies which are ostensibly aimed at encouraging and enabling individuals
to lead healthier lives.1 These draw on behavioural research which
1 See, for example, HM Government, Healthy Lives, Healthy People: Our Strat-
egy for Public Health in England (The Stationary Office 2010). Available at
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purportedly shows that individuals are not the kind of rational,
advantage-seeking decision-makers which some rational choice models
predict.2 Such research, therefore, seeks social, cognitive, and other expla-
nations of behaviour. Its main interest lies in what people actually do and
why they do those things. In general terms, the conclusion reached is that
people are lacking ‘clear, stable, or well-ordered preferences’ and that
their behaviour is susceptible to the influence of ‘default rules, framing
effects . . . and starting points’.3 It is hoped that, by using behavioural
insights provided by such research, people can be ‘nudged’ towards
making decisions which are better for their health.4 Strategies can
involve ‘[c]hanging the way options are presented or altering the natural
and physical environment [in order to] make it more likely that a particu-
lar choice becomes the natural or default preference’.5
Wherever institutions, private or public, can construct sets of options
from which people choose, they have become ‘choice architects’.6 Thus,
where the state pursues policies aimed at influencing the decisions that
its citizens make regarding their health, it becomes a choice architect for
its citizens’ health. Such policies need not be confined to institutions
whose main business is health (or health care). It might include initiatives
which have health effects, even if they are based in other state run depart-
ments such as food, agriculture, or transport. For example, making
bicycles available through public hire schemes may alter social norms
and nudge people to cycle rather than taking other transport.7 In the
UK, behavioural approaches (rightlyor wrongly) have become an integral
part of the public health strategy of successive Governments. The latest in-
carnation of this can be seen in its application to the policy arena of re-
search findings from behavioural psychology and economics. To this
,http://www.dh.gov.uk/health/2011/07/healthy-lives-healthy-people/. last
accessed 2 July 2013.
2 For example, G Becker, ‘Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory’ (1962) 70 J
Pol Econ 1; G Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (University
of Chicago Press, Chicago 1978, 1990).
3 C Sunstein and RH Thaler, ‘Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron’
(2003) 70 U Chic L Rev 1159, 1161.
4 It should be noted that so-called nudging is not limited to health, but can encom-
passall sortsof social policygoals.TheworkofRichardThalerhasbeenparticu-
larly influential in bringing this approach to the table in UK policy circles. See
Sunstein and Thaler, above, n 3, RH Thaler and C Sunstein, ‘Libertarian Pater-
nalism’ (2003) 93 Am Econ Rev 175; RH Thaler and C Sunstein, Nudge: Im-
proving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness (Penguin Books,
London 2008, 2009).
5 House of Lords Science and Technology Select Committee, Behaviour Change
(The Stationery Office, London 2011) 11.
6 Thaler and Sunstein 2009, above, n 4, ch 5.
7 Cabinet Office Behavioural Insights Team. Applying Behavioural Insight to
Health 2010, 22. Available at ,http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/
files/resources/403936_BehaviouralInsight_acc.pdf..
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end, the Cabinet Office has set up the Behavioural Insights Team (COBIT
or the so-called nudge unit), which has made the public’s health one of its
priority areas.8
This article constitutes an analysis of these recent policy moves in
respect of health with the aim of addressing some of the concerns which
have been expressed regarding behavioural research-driven regulation
and policy. Specifically, it examines the idea of influencing, shaping,
and constructing choices through public policy. In order to do this,
I look at the recent behavioural turn in law and policy, particularly the
idea of ‘nudging’,9 and outline some of the research from the behavioural
sciences which has caught the attention of government in the UK. I show
how such moves reflect an underlying political ideologyabout the law and
regulation and how this is already impacting on health-affecting regula-
tion and public policy. Following this I argue that, although the new
vogue in the policy arena involves influencing the choice architecture
that surrounds us, many health-affecting choices are already in some
sense ‘constructed’ or ‘shaped’. Given this, I look at whether we have
any reasons, ethically-speaking, to prefer sets of health-affecting options
which are randomly constructed as opposed to those which can be said
to have been intentionally designed by the state. In so doing, I take issue
with some of the arguments by commentators who are concerned about
the effect of ‘government efforts to shape choices’ on our decision-making
capacities.10 I contend that certain objections to state-mediated
8 See, for example, Cabinet Office Behavioural Insights Team, Applying Behav-
ioural Insight to Health 2010 (available at ,http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/
sites/default/files/resources/403936_BehaviouralInsight_acc.pdf. last accessed 2
July 2013) and HM Government, above, n 1. Additionally, this approach is
gaining ground in France in relation to health initiatives see Centre for Strategic
Analysis, Improving Public Health Prevention with Behavioural, Cognitive &
Neuroscience 2010 (available at ,http://oullier.free.fr/files/2010_Oullier-
Sauneron_CAS-Neuroscience-Prevention-Public-Health_Book_Neuroeconomics-
Behavioral-Economics-Neuromarketing.pdf. last accessed 2 July 2013).
9 Much of what is said here is also applicable to influences which would not be
considered as nudges per se. However, we should guard against conflating
‘nudge’ with ‘influence’, a slippage which seems to have occurred as the idea
of nudging has permeated popular consciousness and been adopted as a
policyapproach. Foran analysis whichdifferentiates nudges fromothercategor-
ies of influence see Y Saghai, ‘Salvaging the Concept of Nudge’ (2013) 39 J Med
Ethics 487.
10 DM Hausman and B Welch, ‘Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge’ (2010) 18 J
Pol Phil 123, 135. Similar concerns have been raised, among others, by MD
White, ‘We’ve Been Nudged: The Effects of the Downturn on Dignity and Re-
sponsibility’ in MA Starr (ed), Consequences of Economic Downturn: Beyond
the Usual Economics (Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2011) 103; L Bovens,
‘The Ethics of Nudge’ in T Grüne-Yanoff and SO Hansson (eds), Preference
Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology (Springer
Dordrecht, London 2009) 207; E Selinger and KP Whyte, ‘Competence &
Trust in Choice Architecture’ (2010) 23 Know Techn Pol 461.
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interventions imply that there is some sort of moral priority to be given to
situations in which the choice architecture is due either to (a) random pro-
cesses or (b) the result of the influence of private enterprise or interests
rather than state-driven interests. I argue that no such moral priority
ought to be accorded in this regard. Further, I argue that we might some-
times have reason to prefer a deliberately constructed health-affecting
choice environment. Nonetheless, at the end of the article, I indicate
that, given the number and complexity of influences on our health-
affecting decision-making processes, there are largely unanswered
questions about how behavioural research translates into policy and
regulatory initiatives.
II. NUDGING, CHOICE ARCHITECTURE, AND PUBLIC
HEALTH POLICY
In liberal legal and political philosophy, autonomyand respect for the au-
tonomous choices of individuals are often emphasised when examining
how the law ought to operate and how social institutions ought to be
structured.11 The law, along with the institutions and instruments
through which it is operationalised, ought not be coercive or infringe ex-
cessively on a person’s liberty and autonomy, or so the argument goes. A
specific instance where such arguments are brought to bear is in the arena
of public health and debates about what measures are acceptable to
achieve desired public health outcomes (for example, decreasing
smoking, alcohol intake, or obesity). Certain arguments in this arena
either maintain that the law has no business interfering in a realm
which is essentially about personal lifestyle choices12 or that, if
health-affecting lifestyle decisions and activities do fall within the
ambit of the law, the least intrusive or constraining approaches to regulat-
ing these ought to be used.13 Arguments along these lines could be seen as
gaining some of their justificatory power from our traditional accounts of
11 See, for example, J Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to
Self (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1986), chs 17 and 18.
12 Forexample, R Epstein, ‘In Defense of the Old Public Health: The Legal Frame-
work for the Regulation of Public Health’ (2004) 69 Brook L Rev 1421. For a
critique of Epstein’s and other libertarian approaches to public health see J
Coggon, What Makes Health Public? A Critical Evaluation of Moral, Legal,
& Political Claims in Public Health (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
2012) 153–63.
13 See, for example, R Upshur, ‘Principles for the Justification of Public Health
Intervention’ (2002) 93 Can J Public Health 101, 102. See also JF Childress,
RR Faden and others, ‘Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain’ (2002) 30
J Law Med Ethics 170, 173. However, the claim (often taken as self-evident)
that the least restrictive means is the (legally and) morally desirable course of
action requires more work. The latter paper does suggest the least infringement
principle as a means of resolving conflicts amongst competing moral
Med. L. Rev. Nudging for Health 591
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autonomy and rationality. Where individuals are seen as being rational
actors then decisions about how to live their lives ought to be left up to
them, (ostensibly) free from the long arm of the law. Thus, neoclassical
accounts of rationality would support the argument that the law with
respect to the public’s health ought to be constructed in a manner
which does not (unjustifiably) constrain the liberty of citizens. Likewise,
the institutions and instruments through which the law operates, which
have a bearing on the public’s health, ought not to employ overly con-
straining methods. However, recently behavioural research is being
used to challenge this position. We are, according to research in the be-
havioural sciences, imperfect decision-makers. We do not always act ra-
tionally in our own best interests. Instead, we are what Dan Ariely terms
predictably irrational.14 Part of the reason for this is that we all fall foul of
a number of cognitive biases which affect the way we make decisions. By
taking such biases into account when formulating health policy, the Gov-
ernment hopes to be able to ‘nudge’ citizens to make better decisions in
this respect.
A nudge (as opposed to some other intervention) is ‘an aspect of choice
architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way without
forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incen-
tives.’15 Choice architecture simply refers to the context in which we
choose and make decisions, but, as we will see below, this is important
because the context itself can influence the way we think and the decisions
we make. Thus, where our behaviour changes due to some aspect of the
choice architecture which surrounds us we can be said to have been
nudged. Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein argue that nudges (properly
conceived) belong to a political and economic ‘third way’ which they
dub libertarian paternalism:16 ‘paternalism’ because they think ‘it is legit-
imate for private and public institutions to attempt to influence people’s
behaviour’ and ‘steer people’s choices in directions that will improve the
choosers’ own welfare’17 and ‘libertarian’ since they maintain that this
ought to be done in a way that preserves ‘freedom of choice on grounds
of either autonomy or welfare’.18 Take, for example, the potentially
health-affecting nudge mentioned earlier in the introduction: cycle hire
considerations and outlines the need to take into account other factors such as
effectiveness and proportionality.
14 D Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces that Shape Our Decisions
(Harper, London 2009).
15 Thaler and Sunstein 2009, above, n 4 at 6.
16 Ibid at 253–4. For a critique of Nudge as an ambitious political project see
P Schlag, ‘Nudge, Choice Architecture, & Libertarian Paternalism’ (2010)
108 Mich Law Rev 913.
17 Sunstein and Thaler 2009, above, n 3 at 1162.
18 Ibid at 1160.
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schemes in cities. The idea behind this is that ‘seeing more people cycle
would create a new social norm and visual prompt, encouraging more
people to want to cycle’.19 More bicycles in cities does not foreclose the
option of taking the bus or driving, but does attempt to harness the
powers of norms (of which more will be said below) to particular policy
ends. In this case, there might be at least two such ends; first, to increase
the amount of exercise that people take, and thereby contribute to
making them healthier, by nudging them to cycle more and, second, to de-
crease the amount of congestion and pollution that results from cars and
other vehicles. The economic incentives from the viewpoint of the cyclist
do not necessarily change (something required by Thaler and Sunstein’s
own definition), since they need not hire the bicycles from the scheme as
they may already have their own.20
The rhetorical appeal of the terminology used by Thaler and Sunstein is
clear. In utilising the seemingly oxymoronic label, libertarian paternal-
ism, they are indicating that they think such an approach to law and
policy21 falls between the extremes of top-down command and control
regulation on the one hand and laissez-faire libertarian market capitalism
on the other.22 This policy turn in relation to public health is evident.
In the short time, since COBIT was set up, behavioural approaches
have started to be investigated and, to some extent, integrated into
health-related domestic policy in a number of areas. Specifically, there
has been a focus on organ donation, smoking, diet,23 alcohol intake,
19 COBIT, above, n 7 at 22.
20 In any case even if a person was initially nudged to buy a bicycle, the cost may
even out over time if they save money on fuel or on the cost of public transport.
21 We should be careful to distinguish between the idea of using the behavioural
sciences to inform law and policy and the claim that any strategies adopted
ought to be justified by an appeal to libertarian paternalism as the underlying
political philosophy. In this article, I do not address whether libertarian pater-
nalism is legitimate (or indeed preferable to otherapproaches to lawand policy)
in this respect, but instead focus on the issues relating to altering the choice en-
vironment in which citizens make health-affecting decisions.
22 See A Burgess, ‘Nudging Healthy Lifestyles: The UK Experiments with the
Behavioural Alternative to Regulation and the Market’ (2012) 1 EJRR 3. As
evidence that such strategies could indeed be perceived as a real third way, gov-
ernment and policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic (Obama’s Democrats
and Cameron’s Conservatives) have taken up the libertarian paternalist agenda
with enthusiasm. In the USA, its influence is most evident with the appointment
of Cass Sunstein as the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regula-
tory Affairs (although he stepped down from this post in 2012). In the UK
Richard Thaler acts as an advisor to the Cameron Government.
23 In particular, in 2010/11, there was a focus on the salt content of food. See
Cabinet Office Behavioural Insights Team, Behavioural Insights Team
Annual Update 2010–11, 7–9 (available at ,http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.
uk/sites/default/files/resources/Behaviour-Change-Insight-Team-Annual-
Update_acc.pdf. last accessed 2 July 2013) and Salt Strategy Beyond 2012
(available at ,https://responsibilitydeal.dh.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/
Med. L. Rev. Nudging for Health 593
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physical activity, and reducing prescription errors and missed appoint-
ments within the NHS.24 It is notable that the usual lifestyle factors
(smoking, alcohol intake, exercise, and diet) are part of the latest policy
moves. These are familiar targets in government public health strategies
and not without good reason. Together poor diet, lack of exercise,
smoking, and excessive alcohol intake represent a significant public
health challenge. For example, in England 61.3% of adults are either
overweight or obese25 and approximately 21% smoke.26 It is estimated
that obesity costs the National Health Service (NHS) in excess of £5bn
annually and is associated with type 2 diabetes, heart disease, and
cancer, while smoking-related illnesses cost the NHS and society at
large over £13.74bn annually.27 Part of the strategy in relation to
alcohol is illustrative of the new approach and how the implementation
of policy could alter choice architecture in way which may be
health-affecting. In this regard, three of the major supermarkets have
entered into a ‘responsibility deal’ with the Government and agreed not
to display alcohol at the front of their stores.28 This initiative reflects the
implementation of behavioural research, which showsthat theway the en-
vironment is constructed can shape a person’s choices within it. For
example, in relation to food, it has been shown that ease of access, prox-
imity to the food, and the amount of effort needed to be exerted to get it all
affect consumption.29 Thus, it is hoped that by changing the choice archi-
tecture in the supermarket, that is changing the positioning of alcohol pro-
ducts, there will be a reduction in the amount being purchased.
2013/03/Salt-Strategy-Beyond-2012.pdf. last accessed 2 July 2013).
Although a recent report by the Institute of Medicine demonstrates that the
evidence on sodium intake is not as clear cut as often assumed. See Institute
of Medicine, Sodium Intake in Populations: Assessment of Evidence (National
Academies Press, Washington 2013) (available at ,http://www.nap.edu/
catalog.php?record_id=18311. last accessed 2 July 2013).
24 See Behavioural Insights Team Annual Update 2010–11, ibid and Cabinet
Office Behavioural Insights Team, Behavioural Insights Team Annual
Update 2011–12 (available at ,https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/83719/Behavioural-Insights-Team-
Annual-Update-2011-12_0.pdf. last accessed 2 July 2013).
25 Department of Health, Healthy Lives, Healthy People: Call to Action on
Obesity, 2011, 10 (available at ,https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/134840/dh_130487.pdf.pdf. last
accessed 2 July 2013).
26 Department of Health, Healthy Lives, Healthy People: Tobacco Control Plan,
2011, 15 (available at ,https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/135349/dh_124960.pdf.pdf. last accessed 2
July 2013).
27 See, respectively, DoH, above, n 25, 16 and ibid, 17.
28 COBIT, above, n 23 and Department of Health, The Public Health Responsi-
bility Deal (Crown Copyright 2011) 24.
29 See, for example, P Rozin and others, ‘Nudge to Nobesity I: Minor Changes in
Accessibility Decrease Food Intake’ (2011) 6 Judgm Decis Mak 323.
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As Yashar Saghai notes, however, we ought not to make the mistake of
thinking that all nudges are forms of libertarian paternalism; the latter
being a ‘justificatory strategy for a subset of nudges’.30 A key criterion
of this subset of nudges is that they are for the benefit of those nudged,
but not all nudges benefit the nudgee.31 This is evident from the Govern-
ment’s priority areas listed above. While strategies in relation to smoking,
the salt contentof food,andalcoholmayseeminglybe for thebenefitof the
nudgee, those in relation to organ donation, prescription errors, and
missed appointments are not (at least in a direct sense). Take organ dona-
tion, for example. Since July 2011, those applying for or renewing their
driving licence are required to answer one of three questions regarding
registration on the NHS Organ Donor Register (yes, I would like to regis-
ter, I do not wish to answer this question now, or I am already regis-
tered).32 Yet, while we might argue that we all benefit if more organs
are available for transplantation, the nudgee in this case does not directly
benefit. For the purpose of this article, my arguments can generally be
taken to be referring to the subset of nudges which are intended to be
for the benefit of those nudged. In addition, throughout this article, we
should be careful not to elide two potential readings of what it means to
be ‘nudged’ and which could be imputed from some of the literature re-
ferred to. If it is the case that a nudge is an aspect of the choice architecture
which makes it more likely that a person’s behaviour will be changed in a
particular way then two possible analyses follow. On the one hand, we
might regard a person as having been nudged regardless of the efficacy
of the nudge employed; that is, whether or not it actually works (well).
On the other, we might reserve the use of the term only for those cases
where behaviour is in fact altered.33 For the purposes of my arguments,
I use either ‘nudges’ or ‘nudge strategies’ to denote plans, policies, and
attempts to nudge, whether successful or not. I apply active terms, such
as ‘nudged’, for those situations in which behaviour change has occurred.
A. (Public) Health and the Politics of New Regulatory Strategies
There have been calls for some time for a new approach to public health in
the UK. This is consequent on the recognition and acceptance that health
problems often have a complex and multi-faceted aetiology.34 In
30 Saghai, above, n 9, 2.
31 Ibid.
32 See ,http://www.nhsbt.nhs.uk/about/partners_and_supporters/dvla.html.
last accessed 2 July 2013.
33 Thank you to one of the anonymous reviewers for this point.
34 See, forexample, Independent Inquiry into Inequalities inHealth, Reportof the
Independent Inquiry into Inequalities in Health (The Stationery Office,
London 1998); The Marmot Review, Fair Society, Healthy Lives: Strategic
Review of Health Inequalities in England post-2010 (available at ,http://
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particular, there is evidence that a range of social and other factors influ-
ence individual health outcomes. These include early health status, educa-
tional attainment, employment (or lack thereof) and working conditions,
and income level.35 This has in turn been acknowledged in a variety of
Government reports.36 One consequence of problems which are multi-
faceted is that any possible solutions may be equally difficult and
thorny. As such, behavioural approaches represent just one part of the
picture in relation to health. Nevertheless, although behaviour change
approaches started under the previous Government and have been vary-
ingly incorporated into policy by different state departments over the
years, they have politically come to the fore under the current Govern-
ment.37 Therefore, notwithstanding the wider health context, this
article substantially focuses on nudging as the most recent policy incarna-
tion of such approaches. The penetration of such strategies with regards to
the regulation of health in this country seems to be a reflection both of an
overarching political ideology and a drive towards minimally disruptive,
market-preserving regulatory strategies which are seen as low-cost.38
www.instituteofhealthequity.org/projects/fair-society-healthy-lives-the-
marmot-review. last accessed 2 July 2013).
35 Marmot Review, ibid, ch 2. Although note that there is concern in some quar-
ters regarding the causalpathways thatmay (ormay not)underlie suchfindings.
For example, Gopal Sreenivasan maintains that ‘Each distinct social variable
might function as a “marker” for a different underlying causal factor, different
social variables might function instead as alternative markers for the same
underlying causal factor, or there may be some mixture of both.’ See ‘Justice,
Inequality, and Health’ in EN Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Phil-
osophy (Spring 2009 Edition) (available at ,http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/spr2009/entries/justice-inequality-health. last accessed 2 July
2013).
36 For example, Government Office for Science, Tackling Obesities: Future
Choices – Project Report (2nd edn, 2010); see, in particular, the obesity
systems map on p. 85 (available at ,http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/foresight/
docs/obesity/17.pdf. last accessed 2 July 2013). See also Department of
Health, Tackling Health Inequalities: 10 Years On (Crown Copyright 2009)
and Healthy Lives, Healthy People, above, n 1, 26. This has tackling the
social determinants of health as one of its aims.
37 P John and L Richardson, Nudging Towards Localism (British Academy,
London 2012) 18–25.
38 See HM Government, One-in, One-out: Third Statement of New Regulation
(Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, London 2012). For examples
of the move in this direction in relation to general regulations across sectors, as
well as health and social care see the Cabinet Office’s ‘Red Tape Challenge’:
,http://www.redtapechallenge.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/home/index/. last
accessed 2 July 2013. Although a move in this direction was also evident
under the previous Government. Forexample, a report by the Better Regulation
Commission stated that ‘[a]lternatives to classic regulation will often work
better, stimulate more enterprise and innovation, promote greater freedom
and choice, inspire greater self-reliance and responsibility, be cheaper and
impose fewer burdens.’ See Risk, Responsibility, Regulation: Whose Risk is
it Anyway? (BRC, London 2006) 37 (available at ,http://
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With regards to the first of these, since 2010 the coalition Government’s
‘Big Society’ agenda can be seen as containing the overarching themes
which are the driving force behind many Whitehall initiatives. It is the
manifestation of a political ideology which favours more decentralisation
and de-regulation in its approach to governance than the previous incum-
bents.39 This move to decentralise in relation to health, for example, can
be seen most clearly in the Health and Social Care Act 2012 which, after a
turbulent passage through Parliament, gained Royal Assent last year. The
Act, in abolishing NHS primary care trusts and strategic health author-
ities, makes local clinical commissioning groups the bedrock of the
health service. Related to the political (ideological) commitments to light-
touch regulation and government is a belief that changes in such a direc-
tion will be cost-saving. Thus, the enthusiastic adoption of nudging is at
least partly down to ‘the promise of cost effectiveness; achieving “more
for less”, particularly in public services’.40
Some policy commentators conceptualise nudging as an alternative to
the law and regulation.41 This is understandable if we think of regulation
in classical terms as being about ‘establishing, monitoring and enforcing
legal rules’.42 Yet when purposively deployed by the state to achieve par-
ticular social policy ends, nudging could be seen as another regulatory
technique in its arsenal. Roger Brownsword’s broad definition takes regu-
lation as ‘encompassing whatever measures regulators take to control and
channel conduct in the desired way’.43 In this regard, nudge strategies can
be seen as sitting within design-based approaches to regulation which, as
Karen Yeung outlines, provide the state with tools which are not ‘the
“traditional” policy instruments of command, competition, communica-
tion and consensus’.44 Regulation by design is often associated with what
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100402230200/http://
archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/brc/upload/assets/www.brc.gov.uk/
risk_res_reg.pdf. last accessed 2 July 2013).
39 Burgess, above, n 22, 7. For a brief overview of decentralisation under the
current Government, see HM Governement, ibid, ch 5.
40 Ibid.
41 See, for example, P Rainford and J Tinkler, ‘Designing for Nudge Effects: How
Behaviour Management Can Ease Public Sector Problems’ in Innovating
Through Design in Public Sector Services Seminar Series (LSE Public Policy
Group 23 February 2011) 3 (available at ,http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/37810.
last accessed 2 July 2013).
42 K Yeung and B Morgan, An Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge 2007) 3.
43 R Brownsword, Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 7. Foran article on the different under-
standings of regulation see J Black, ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’ (2002)
27 Aus J Leg Phil 1.
44 K Yeung, ‘Towards an Understanding of Regulation by Design’ in R Brown-
sword and K Yeung (eds), Regulating Technologies (Hart Publishing, Oxford
2009) 79, 80.
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Brownsword terms ‘techno-regulation’.45 This is not about regulating
technologies, but instead describes instances of where technology is
used to ‘design-in a solution to a problem of which regulatees might not
even be aware . . . and by-passes practical reason to eliminate all options
other than the desired pattern of behaviour’.46 Examples of such regula-
tion are computer software where the code can be written in such a way
as to prevent unlicensed copying47 and designing cars in such a way that
the engine will not start unless the seatbelt is fastened.48 Design-based
regulation could be conceived of as almost synonymous with using tech-
nology as a regulatory modality.49 It can, however, also be construed in
a much broader (and looser manner) than strictly technocratic fixes.
Firstly, as the health-related examples in the next two sections will
make clear, the design or alteration of the choice architecture which sur-
rounds us can be used in order to try to achieve particular health policy
goals. This need not be technology-driven. It encompasses a variety of
means which includes not only the use of technology to influence citizens’
decision-making, but also the physical design of places and spaces,50 and
harnessing the power of different methods of information delivery. Sec-
ondly, unlike many techno-regulatory instruments which aim to inhibit
particular actions and eliminate all choice options, a nudge does not (the-
oretically at least) foreclose options to those that are nudged. In general,
nudges are being deployed in situations where individual choice is still
thought to be important; this being exemplified by the focus on ‘lifestyle’
nudges by the government. This differs from examples such as the seat-
belt, where a technocratic fix could be used as an effective means to
enforce a pre-existing legal ban on driving without a seatbelt; legally, at
least, there is no presumptive element of choice here. Contrariwise,
there is apparent choice over other areas of our lives; for instance, what
45 RBrownsword, ‘Code,Control, andChoice: WhyEast isEast and West isWest’
(2005) 25 LS 1, 3.
46 Ibid at 4. Brownsword does not wholeheartedly endorse or reject
techno-regulatory tools in this article, but instead draws our attention to the
tension between control and choice which a move to technocratic solutions
to social problems presents. See also R Brownsword, ‘What the World
Needs Now: Techno-Regulation, Human Rights and Human Dignity’ in
R Brownsword (ed), Human Rights (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2004) 203,
230. Here Brownsword seems to envisage techno-regulation in a much less
stringent manner as merely encompassing the use of technology to aid regula-
tion, although a central worry is about a move to techno-regulatory tools that
leaves no room for choice.
47 L Lessig, ‘The Zones of Cyberspace’ (1996) 48 Stanford Law Rev 1403, 1408.
See also ibid at 3 and Yeung and Morgan, above, n 42, 102–5.
48 K Yeung, ‘Can We Employ Design-Based Regulation While Avoiding Brave
New World?’ (2011) 3 Law Innov Tech 1, 3.
49 K Yeung and M Dixon-Woods, ‘Design-based Regulation and Patient Safety:
A Regulatory Studies Perspective’ (2010) 71 Soc Sci Med 502, 503.
50 Yeung, above, n 44, 81–2.
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we eat.51 Nudges merely make it more likely that a person will choose in
one direction rather than another.
In the sense that these new measures are aimed to bring about particular
outcomes (byaltering certain social norms and behaviours), yet ostensibly
preserve choice, they can be seen as a form of (design-based) regulation-
lite. They are part of the widening gamut of instruments that the govern-
ment can (and do) call upon to regulate the health of its citizens. Although
formal government-led behaviour change initiatives are in their infancy,
with the nudge unit being barely three years old, such strategies seem set
to have the political longevity. A recent report by one of the COBIT advi-
sors recommends that the unit’s remit be extended beyond its initial
term.52 In addition, such strategies are (rightly or wrongly) viewed as a
formof light-touch, low-cost regulationand,given theon-goingeconomic
pressures on state-run departments, are likely to still find favour underany
successive regime, albeit in a potentially re-branded form. In order to
better understand some of the potential issues and objections as well as
benefits in this area, let us look brieflyat how nudges are intended towork.
B. Predicting Irrationalities
As noted already, recent research in the behavioural sciences purports to
show that individuals do not always act rationally in their own best inter-
ests. One explanation for this is that we are prone to make certain predict-
able and systematic errors in judgement. We make such errors
systematically not only in the sense that they are a regular occurrence in
our decision-making processes, but because the biases which arise in the
way we think can be notionally divided into system 1 and system 2
biases.53 These systems can alternatively be referred to as fast thinking
and slow thinking.54 System 1 processes are automatic and largely non-
voluntary, while system 2 thinking is slower, more deliberate, and more
controlled.55 Biases and cognitive errors can arise due to ‘stumbles’ in
either system.56 There are a number of heuristics (rules of thumb),
51 Although we will see a little later why this may only be ‘apparent’ choice.
52 John and Richardson, above, n 37, 7–8.
53 KE Stanovich and RF West, ‘Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications
for the Rationality Debate?’ (2000) 23 Behav Brain Sci 645, 658.
54 For an engaging overview of this see Daniel Kahneman’s latest book, especially
part 1, which derives its title from this distinction: Thinking, Fast and Slow
(Allen Lane, London 2011). Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in Economics in
2002 (although he is a psychologist) for his work with the late Amos Tversky
on judgement and decision-making. He is generally credited with being the
father of behavioural economics.
55 Ibid at 20–1.
56 O Amir and O Lobel, ‘Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics
Informs Law and Policy’ (2008) 108 Columbia Law Rev 2098, 2110. I take
the reference to ‘stumbles’ from this article where the authors open by noting
that ‘[t]o stumble is human’.
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biases, and effects which can all affect how we think.57 For instance, we
categorise persons and objects based on how similar they are to stereo-
types which we hold (representative heuristic).58 Doing so, however,
can lead us to disregard other information which might have a bearing
on what we are thinking about. Further, our assessment of the frequency
or probabilityof anevent is affected by the easewith which we can thinkof
a pertinent or recent example of the occurrence (availability heuristic).59
We are also influenced by reference points and starting points. These can
affect estimates that we make, including the value we place on things
(anchoring, priming, and adjustment).60 Studies have also shown that
we do not like losses and weigh them heavier than equivalent gains (loss
aversion),61 when presented with options we tend to stick with the
default one (status quo bias),62 and the manner in which information is
presented to us affects our perception of that information (framing
effects).63
The idea behind behaviour-driven health policy and law formation is
that we can work either to eliminate or harness errors and biases64 in
order to achieve certain health-affecting outcomes; for example, decreas-
ing the amount of unhealthy foods that people eat and increasing the
amount of physical activity they do. In this respect, the UK Government
has produced a series of reports and policy documents which draw to
varying extents on the existing body of behavioural research.65 Their
MINDSPACE framework sets out what they see as ‘some of the most
robust (non-coercive) influences on our behaviour’.66 The MINDSPACE
57 For an entertaining overview see Thaler and Sunstein 2009, above, n 4, 24–40.
These have been studied by psychologists over the years building on the seminal
work of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman who conducted studies of how
we think under conditions of uncertainty. See A Tversky and D Kahneman,
‘Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’ (1974) 185 Science 1124.
58 Tversky and Kahneman, ibid, 1124–7.
59 Ibid at 1127–8.
60 Ibid at 1128–30.
61 D Kahneman, JL Knetsch, and RH Thaler, ‘Anomalies: The Endowment
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias’ (1991) 5 J Econ Perspect 193,
199–203.
62 Ibid at197–9.
63 ATversky and D Kahneman, ‘The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice’ (1981) 211 Science 453.
64 Amir and Lobel, above, n 56, 2114 and 2117.
65 See COBIT, above, n 7; COBIT, above, n 23; Department of Health, The Public
Health Responsibility Deal (Crown Copyright 2011); HM Government,
above, n 1; P Dolan and others, Mindspace: Influencing Behaviour Through
Public Policy (Institute for Government 2010) (available at ,http://
www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/images/files/MINDSPACE-full.pdf.
last accessed 2 July 2013).
66 Ibid at 8. Note that this report is not an official Government policy document
rather it is a discussion document. However, the framework has been incorpo-
rated into subsequent policy documents, see COBIT, above, n 7.
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acronym (Messenger, Incentives, Norms, Defaults, Salience, Priming,
Affect, Commitment, and Ego)67 is intended to function as a checklist
to be drawn on when making policy. This is set out in the table below,68
along with an indication of some of the heuristics, biases, and effects
which are represented.
There is not space here to discuss all of the factors which influence be-
haviour, but I want to briefly look at how some of our biases could be miti-
gated or harnessed in ways which are health-affecting. By referring to
some proposed and potential policy or regulatory initiatives, which aim
to influence us by changing the choice architecture, I illustrate how, in
the context of health, we do not make decisions in a context-free environ-
ment. Choice architecture is all around us.69 As such, our choices are con-
stantly at the behest of a myriad of influences. We do not, therefore, even
need to consider new policy initiatives to see that our choice-environment
and health-affecting decisions are to some extent already shaped and
constructed.
Messenger (framing effect) We are heavily influenced by who communicates
information
Incentives (loss aversion and
status quo bias)
Our responses to incentives are shaped by
predictable mental shortcuts such as strongly
avoiding losses
Norms We are strongly influenced by what others do
Defaults (status quo bias) We ‘go with the flow’ of pre-set options
Salience (framing effect) Ourattention is drawn towhat is novel and seems
relevant to us
Priming (anchoring heuristic) Our acts are often influenced by sub-conscious
cues
Affect Ouremotional associations canpowerfullyshape
our actions
Commitment We seek to be consistent with our public
promises, and reciprocate acts
Ego We act in ways that make us feel better about
ourselves
67 This would seem to be a (longer) version of Thaler and Sunstein’s own acronym
‘NUDGES’: iNcentives, Understand mappings, Defaults, Give feedback,
Expect error, and Structure complex choices (above, n 4, 109).
68 Dolan and others, above, n 65. The table is taken directly from Mindspace and I
have added in the heuristics, biases, and effects which might be at play in some
of the shorthand categories of influence.
69 Thaler and Sunstein 2009, above, n 4, ch 5.
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C. Constructing, Shaping, and Influencing (Health) Choices?
Let us look more closelyat some strategies which are intended to alter par-
ticular target behaviour: increasing physical activity taken, decreasing the
amount of alcohol consumed, and decreasing smoking. An overarching
strategy in the behaviourchange arsenal is to alter the norms around a par-
ticularactivityorbehaviour. One examplealready mentioned is the public
cycle hire scheme. With such a scheme, an increased availability of bicycles
could lead to an increase in the number of cyclists on the road. This would,
hopefully, then nudge others into cycling by contributing to altering the
norm around transport. In relation to alcohol, a campaign outlining how
little people drink could be used to try to decrease the amount of alcohol
being consumed. This would be in stark contrast to traditional public
health campaigns which have tended to emphasise our excesses and their
effects. However, people tend to overestimate what others drink.70 When
we shift the emphasis of such campaigns, to highlight real (lower) levels
ofdrinking,attention iscalled towhatpeopleactuallydo.Sinceweare influ-
enced by what others do, a new descriptive norm is formed and this affects
the social acceptability of the target activity. This approach works better
than merely telling people what they ought to do since knowledge of
what other people are actually doing or are perceived to be doing is more
powerful.71 A similar norms-based strategy could be utilised to try and de-
crease the number of people who smoke.
While altering the norm might be a longer-term strategy, different influ-
ences can be used to contribute to this. For example, where public health
campaigns convey information about the frequency of smoking or drink-
ing an anchor can be created. Anchoring describes how we fasten on to
particular ‘trait[s] or information when making decisions’.72 Therefore,
presented with a lower frequency of smoking we may adjust our reference
point and this, in conjunction with wanting to do what others do, could
lead to lower numbers of smokers.73 Along with this, an approach
70 COBIT, above, n 23, 8. In this regard, we fall prey to the availability heuristic;
that is, we assess the frequency of an event based on the ease of which examples
can be brought to mind. ‘Incidents of alcohol abuse are easily recalled’ (Thaler
and Sunstein 2009, above, n 4, 73).
71 RBCialdini, ‘CraftingNormativeMessagestoProtect theEnvironment’ (2003)
12 Current Directions Psychol Sci 105. For an example of the power of norms
on wearing seatbelts in vehicles see J Linkenbach and HW Perkins, Most of Us
Wear Seatbelts: The Process and Outcomes of a 3-year Statewide Adult Seatbelt
Campaign in Montana. Presented at the National Conference on the Social
Norms Model, Boston, MA, 17 July 2003 (see also ,http://
www.mostofus.org/project-gallery/traffic-safety/2010/most-of-us%C2%AE-
wear-seatbelts-campaign-2002-2003. last accessed 2 July 2013).
72 K Yeung, ‘Nudge as Fudge’ (2012) 75 MLR 122, 125.
73 Thaler and Sunstein 2009, above, n 4, 73–4. See also JW Linkenbach, ‘The
Montana Model: Development and Overview of a Seven-step Process for
Implementing Macro-level Social Norms Campaigns’ in HW Perkins (ed),
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discussed by the Government is to use the influence of making commit-
ments; when these are made publicly or to significant others, individuals
are more likely to follow through on their promises.74 As such, smokers
wanting to quit could be encouraged to make a public commitment to
friends or family regarding their stated goal. Other initiatives could
attempt to harness the power of affect and salience.75 The driving idea
in this regard is that altering our emotional states can change people’s be-
haviour. Thus, for example, making physical activity fun and enjoyable
could make it more likely that individuals would participate.76 Further,
by making activities novel, they are made more engaging. This combined
with targeting can make them seem more relevant to specific groups. Of
course, the problem with novelty is that it wears off. Therefore, the long-
term effects that might result from novel initiatives is an open question.
While they could be used as a hook to kick start lifestyle changes, the
longer term approach may lie in altering social and cultural norms sur-
rounding a particular practice.
Where regulators and policy-makers take approaches such as those just
outlined they are actively altering the context in which we make choices.
From the examples given, we can see that this context can be influenced by
presenting options in a different manner or by making changes to the en-
vironment in which decisions are made. These strategies demonstrate how
the decisions and choices which we make can be shaped by a variety of
factors around us, including the physical, environmental, social, and in-
formational. This shaping of decisions is exactly what some commenta-
tors are concerned about (of which I will say more in the next section).
However, ‘influence’ does not simply appear de novo whenever a new
policy is implemented. Prior to any new policy, individuals are already
being influenced, albeit by a potentially different set of factors. Take,
The Social Norms Approach to Preventing School and College Age Substance
Abuse (Josseey-Bass, San Francisco 2003) 182–208; JW Linkenbach and HW
Perkins, ‘Most of As Are Tobacco Free: An Eight-month Social Norms Cam-
paign Reducing Youth Initiation of Smoking in Montana’ in HW Perkins
(ed), The Social Norms Approach to Preventing School and College Age Sub-
stance Abuse (Josseey-Bass, San Francisco 2003) 224–34.
74 COBIT, above, n 7, 9.
75 Ibid at 19–22.
76 The much cited example of this is the ‘piano stairs’ where steps on a stairs were
turned into piano keys which played music when stepped on. See ,www.
rolighetsteorin.se., ,www.youtube.com/watch?v=ivg56TX9kWI., and
,www.thefuntheory.com. last accessed 2 July 2013. Another non-
health-relatedexampleof usingnoveltyand fun to alterbehaviour iswith recyc-
ling. Turninga glass recycling bin intoa ‘bottlebank arcadegame’ wherepoints
could be scored for depositingglass bottles increased thenumberbeing recycled
(in comparison to a nearby ordinary bottle bank, see ,http://www.youtube.
com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=zSiHjMU-MUo. and ,www.
thefuntheory.com. last accessed 2 July 2013.
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for example, a paradigmatic case of nudging: the cafeteria.77 Paul Rozin
and colleagues have recently demonstrated that altering the layout of
foodsat a saladbarcan have an effect on food consumption.78 Theyexam-
ined ‘the influence of minorchanges in accessibilityon food intake in a real
world situation’.79 They found that intake of a particular food (e.g. broc-
coli or cheese) decreased when placed in a more inaccessible position and
when serving tongs rather than spoons were used.80 Taking the findings of
this study into account, should cafeterias implement a policy of placing
healthier foods in more accessible locations on the salad bar? If they
decide to do so, they are without doubt influencing (albeit in a potentially
minor manner) the eating habits of their patrons. Yet, contrariwise, if they
do not make any changes, and leave the salad bar as it normally is, they
are still exerting an influence; they are, perhaps unbeknownst to them-
selves, nudging their customers to put the more accessible foods on
their plates.
A similar point can be made with reference to default options. As com-
mentators note, defaults are sticky.81 This is because when choosing we
tend to exhibit preferences for the current state of affairs over some alter-
native.82 Given that this is the case, there is, therefore, something to be
said for government, regulators, and policy-makers setting defaults
in a manner that is beneficial to citizens. One interesting healthcare
example, although not for the (direct) benefit of the person whose behav-
iour the default aims to influence, is that of mechanical ventilators in in-
tensive care units. It has been demonstrated that changing the default
settings on ventilators to ‘provide lower air volumes into patient’s
lungs’ led to a 25% decrease in mortality.83 When the default setting
was changed, this took advantage of the fact that the intensive care phy-
sicians (like all of us) exhibit a bias for the status quo. Yet before the
default was altered the exact same bias was at play. Given this bias, we
can imagine uses for defaults in the pursuit of improved public health
outcomes; for instance, patients could be automatically opted-in to
appointments as part of screening programmes, such as cervical
smears for the early detection of cervical cancer, or for vaccinations as
77 See Thaler and Sunstein 2009, above, n 4, 1–4 and Sunstein and Thaler, above,
n 3, 1164–6. I follow Luc Bovens by saying that this is a paradigm case of
nudging. See Bovens, above, n 10, 207.
78 Rozin and others, above, n 29.
79 Ibid at 329.
80 Ibid at 325–9.
81 Amir and Lobel, above, n 56, 2120.
82 Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, above, n 61, 197–9.
83 Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome Network, ‘Ventilation with Lower Tidal
Volumes as Compared with Traditional Tidal Volumes for Acute Lung Injury
and the Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome’ (2000) 342 NEJM 1301.
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part of a vaccination programme.84 Individuals could always choose not
to attend, but changing the default might make it more likely that they
would turn up.
The lesson here about choice architecture is simple: we cannot escape
the myriad of influences that surround us.85 They shape our decisions,
our choices, and, cumulatively, our lives. In this regard, a plausible inter-
pretation of the current state of health is that it is due to multiple factors
and influences that have nudged us in the direction of obesity, diabetes,
ill-health, etc. These nudges and other influences might include the de-
creasing availability of green spaces for play and exercise, the increasing
availability of entertaining media which encourage non-movement,
increased portion sizes of meals, the layout of our supermarkets and
cafeterias, the lack of safe and accessible bicycle lanes, and many other
factors. Each one of these occurrences on its own may not explain the
overall health picture, but each has contributed to it and in unison
may add up to give us a larger significant explanation. If this is correct,
then there is a real sense in which our health-affecting decisions and
choices have been shaped by those who construct the contexts in
which these are made. In this regard, as noted in the introduction, we
can think of public institutions as choice architects where they can con-
struct or shape sets of options from which people choose and which are
aimed at influencing the decisions made. If we accept the implications of
behavioural research, it becomes clear that, regardless of the implemen-
tation of new health-affecting law and policy, we are already being
nudged (if not always then often). The relevant issues, therefore,
would not seem to be ones about choice architecture and choice con-
struction per se, but ones about who the architect is and to what ends
they are trying to exert influence. The pertinent question in this respect
is whether we have reasons to prefer choice architecture that results
from countless random influences or that which has been deliberately
designed? And, with regard to the latter, whether there is any moral pri-
ority tobe accorded to private and corporate actors whoseek to influence
us rather than to the state? In order to examine these questions let us look
at some objections to behavioural approaches in general and nudging in
particular.
84 For a discussion of this in the context of the Danish breast-screening pro-
gramme, see T Ploug, S Holm, and J Brodersen, ‘To Nudge or Not to Nudge:
Cancer Screening Programmes & the Limits of Libertarian Paternalism’
(2012) 66 J Epidemiol Commun H 1193.
85 Sunstein and Thaler, above, n 3, 1164. See also Hausman and Welch, above, n
10, 132.
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III. REGULATING HEALTH AND IMPLICATING
(IR)RATIONALITY
The overarching tenor of concerns regarding nudges as (health) policy
instruments revolves around the fact that changes, such as those described
in the previous section, can affect decision-making and choices without
the individual being aware that they have been nudged or influenced in
this manner. The reason for this is that:
[T]he causal mechanism through which choice architecture is
intended towork deliberately seeks to by-pass the individual’s ration-
aldecision-makingprocesses in order to channelbehaviour in thedir-
ection preferred by the choice architect. The entire basis upon which
such policies are constructed rests on the premise that, due to various
cognitive ‘defects’, individuals frequently fail to exercise their powers
of reasoned self-deliberation, and this failure can be exploited to
‘nudge’ choices in a particular direction.86
The fact that exploitation of our cognitive biases is central to successful
behaviour change has prompted commentators to put forward several
interrelated worries about nudge and behaviour-driven policy. First,
nudges are neither libertarian nor paternalistic as is claimed.87 Secondly,
to the extent that they aim to be liberty-preserving there ‘is a very thin
understanding of liberty’ at their core.88 Thirdly, they circumvent rational
decision-making and could, therefore, be construed as antithetical to au-
tonomy proper.89 Fourthly, inby-passing our rational processes, they may
in the longer term lead to infantilisation and a decrease in individual re-
sponsibility.90 Finally, to the extent that the success of some nudges
relies on individuals not being actively aware that they are being
nudged, they involve deception91 and perhaps coercion.92 All of these
are also tied to further questions about what the legitimate regulatory
and policy ends of government ought to be; that is, is it a legitimate goal
of government to nudge us towards health-affecting ends? There is not
space in this article to deal with all of these matters, but in the discussion
which follows I touch on some of them. I do this in order to illuminate, in
due course, the arguments as they pertain to choice architecture which is
86 Ibid.
87 Amirand Lobel, above, n 56, 2117–27. See also G Mitchell, ‘Libertarian Pater-
nalism is an Oxymoron’ (2005) 99 NWULR 1245–77.
88 Yeung, above, n 72, 135.
89 Ibid at 136. See also Bovens, above, n 10.
90 See White, above, n 10, 110–3, Bovens, above, n 10, 218, and Yeung, above, n
72, 145–6.
91 White, above, n 10.
92 Ibid. See also Hausman and Welch, above, n 10, 124.
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intentionally designed by the state in order to attempt to regulate
health-affecting behaviour.
A. Liberty, Autonomy, and Control
Earlier, we saw that a nudge is ‘an aspect of choice architecture that alters
people’s behaviour ina predictablewaywithout forbidding anyoptionsor
significantly changing their economic incentives’.93 The supposed liber-
tarian aspect of nudging lies in the fact that the particular nudge employed
ought not to foreclose any options to the chooser; ‘it leaves the choice set
essentially unchanged’.94 This is to be contrasted with more command-
based approaches to regulating health mentioned earlier. Legislation
which stipulates (wearing seatbelts) or proscribes (the smoking ban)
certain courses of action purposefully forecloses options to the would-
be chooser. It is part of the intended purpose of such laws and forms
part of what some might find objectionable about outright bans. For
this reason, one might welcome nudges to the regulatory arsenal. If they
are libertarian as is claimed, and our option set does not change, what
might be the problem? One answer is that the concern about nudging is
not whether it is liberty-affecting in a narrow sense; that is, to do with
altering or not the actual option-set from which we choose. Rather
what is at issue are the implications for autonomy writ large.95 In this
vein, Hausman and Welch argue that:
To the extent that they are attempts to undermine that individual’s
control over her own deliberation, as well as her ability to assess
for herself her alternatives, they are prima facie as threatening to
liberty, broadly understood [that is autonomy].96
Although (strict) nudges do not add or subtract from the options open to
us, they do alter the probability that an individual will make one choice as
opposed to another. For this reason, we might be concerned about how
being nudged affects our judgements and decisions as purportedly au-
tonomous persons.
The general organising idea of autonomy is that, in principle, indivi-
duals can be said to be autonomous to the extent that they govern or
93 Thaler and Sunstein 2009, above, n 4, 6.
94 Hausman and Welch, above, n 10, 125.
95 The autonomy worry is something which has loomed large in the writing of
both critiques and supporters of nudging thus far. See Hausman and Welch,
above, n 10, 128–30; Yeung, above, n 72, 135–38; White, above, n 10,
105–7; Bovens, above, n 10.
96 Hausman and Welch, above, n 10, 130.
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control their own lives.97 This notion is co-extensive with the view of au-
tonomous individuals as self-determining.98 A particular liberal concep-
tion of autonomy is reflected in Isaiah Berlin’s account of positive
liberty. He says:
I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external
forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not
of other men’s acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to
be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes which are my own,
not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be
somebody, notnobody; a doer – deciding, notbeingdecided for, self-
directed and not acted upon byexternal nature or byother men . . . 99
Although to varying degrees all law and regulation attempts to control
or alter the behaviour of individuals or institutions,100 this account
expresses what some find so objectionable about regulation and policy-
making which sets out to alterour behaviour through means which poten-
tially lack transparency and undermine individual control.101 We want
our lives to be guided by our own hand, not by the hand of the state or
Whitehall bureaucrats. We do not want (invisible) external forces
working on us, guiding us to ends which may not be our own. We do
not want just the gloss of superficial liberty. Instead, individual liberty is
important to the extent that is related to how persons live their lives as au-
tonomous beings. When Berlin poses the question ‘What, or who, is the
source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or
be, this rather than that?’,102 the answer for liberals is the individual
themselves.103
It is for reasons related to this that Karen Yeung maintains that, in as
much as nudges aim to be liberty-preserving, there ‘is a very thin under-
standing of liberty’ at their core,104 while, relatedly, Luc Bovens argues
that:
97 Feinberg, above, n 11, 28. Note that Feinberg talks of four different, albeit
related, senses of autonomy: capacity, actual self-government, ideal of charac-
ter, and sovereign authority.
98 G Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge 1988, reprinted 1991) 12–3.
99 I Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ in H Hardy (ed), Liberty, Incorporating
‘Four Essays on Liberty’ (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1969) 166, 178.
100 Yeung and Morgan, above, n 42, 3–4.
101 It is notnecessarilybehaviouralterationper se that is the coreof the objections,
but the manner in which it is being done.
102 Berlin, above, n 99, 178.
103 See JS Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, Edited with an Introduction and
Notes by J Gray (Oxford University Press, New York 1991); Berlin, above,
n 99; Feinberg, above, n 11, ch 18.
104 Yeung, above, n 72, 135.
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There is something less than fully autonomous about the patterns of
decision-making that Nudge taps into. When we are subject to the
mechanisms that are studied in ‘the science of choice’, then we are
not fully in control of our actions . . . these are cases of not letting
my actions be guided by principles that I can underwrite. And in as
much, these actions are non-autonomous.105
Yet we are subject to those mechanisms whether or not the state institutes
policies which aim to influence our behaviour. This is because, as we saw
in the previous section, we are constantly being acted upon by innumer-
able physical, social, environmental, and informational influences. In
this respect, there is something equally non-autonomous about all
manner of decision-making in our everyday lives. When I go to the super-
market to do my weekly grocery shop, a variety of factors might have a
bearing on what I buy: what kind of mood I am in, whether I have eaten
or skipped lunch, how the supermarket is laid out, the smells that
pervade the bakery section, whether or not I bring a pre-prepared list of
items I need, whether there are special offers on, and so on and so forth.
To the extent that these contextual factors circumvent my more deliberate
system 2 thinking, and impact on my automatic and unconscious system 1
processes, they have by-passed my rational judgement. This may involve a
complete or a partial side-stepping of these processes. Decision-making
in such contexts could be characterised as either (substantially) non-
autonomous or merely less than fully autonomous. The former would en-
compass times when there is no engagement of the faculties that facilitate
autonomy, while at other times the processes concerned may involve some
automatic and some deliberative aspects. Either way, I cannot, therefore,
be said tobe (fully) autonomouswith respect to thoseparticulardecisions.
Thus, if the main concern is about the lack of autonomous decision-
making simpliciter, then it has nothing to do with the involvement of
government and policy-makers one way or the other.
In so far as there is reason to be worried about autonomy being sub-
verted, it cannot be because non-autonomous choices and decision-
making are antithetical to how our lives (as moral agents) go in general.
It would not be practical, or indeed possible, to submit every choice,
whim, preference, and decision to a protracted process of introspection
and reflection. As David Archard notes ‘the value of autonomy is to be
found in the leading of lives’.106 As such, we must get on with the business
of leading them. Any conception or ideal of autonomy conceived of as set
apart from the reality of contextual influences is a philosophical fiction.
105 Bovens, above, n 10, 209–10.
106 D Archard, ‘Informed Consent: Autonomy and Self-ownership’ (2008) 25 J
App Phil 19, 21 [emphasis in original].
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It is a fiction that needs to be abandoned and this means accepting our
cognitive limitations and working with them. If we accept that autonomy
need not be heroic107 and that our rationality is bounded by cognitive
and other limitations,108 then we can see that not all non-autonomous
decision-making need be considered undesirable. In fact, a certain level
of non-autonomous functioning helps us go about our daily lives. This
is not to say that it is morally desirable that all choices and decisions be
non-autonomous, merely that it is perhaps the case that more critical re-
flective thinking is not always necessary (more on this will be said later).
Nonetheless, even accepting that choice architecture is pervasive and
impacts on our lives, there are questions to be asked about the kinds and
sources of influences which ought to shape and construct our decisions
and choices. It is to these I now turn.
B. Random or Designed Choice Architecture?
One concern about nudging is specifically about ‘government efforts to
shape choices’.109 For example, Hausmann and Welch claim that
‘[g]overnment action is subject to abuse’.110 Further they maintain that:
No matter how well intentioned government efforts to shape choices
may be, one should be concerned about the risk that exploiting
decision-making foibles will ultimately diminish people’s autono-
mous decision-making capacities.111
Expressing a related concern, White argues that:
Rather than trying to ‘nudge’ people into making certain choices, we
should hold people responsible for the choices they do make—which
does not guarantee they will always make the ‘right’ choices, but they
will be more likely to make choices that reflect their true interests
without introducing moral hazard in the form of a system which
enables mistakes.112
However, given that we cannot escape the nudge-laden contexts in which
we make decisions, dowe have any reason to prefer sets of health-affecting
options which are randomly shaped or constructed as opposed to those
which can be said to have been intentionally designed by the state? In
asking this question, let me begin by clarifying what I mean by random
107 See L Haworth, Autonomy: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology and Ethics
(Yale University Press, New Haven 1986) 39.
108 For the idea of bounded rationality see H Simon, Sciences of the Artificial (3rd
edn MIT Press 1999).
109 Hausman and Welch, above, n 10, 135 [emphasis added].
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 White, above, n 10, 111.
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as opposed to designed choices or option-sets. What I am referring to here
is the manner in which the choice architecture surrounding us is formed.
Our lived-environment, as we have already seen, consists of a multitude of
different influences, physical, environmental, social, informational, and
much more; each of these individually or in concert nudges us in different
directions to diverse ends. This can be seen as randomly constructed to the
extent that such influences have not been deliberately planned to bring
aboutparticularoutcomesorends.Ontheotherhand, the choicearchitec-
ture can be conceived of as (at least partially) designed where some
agent or other actor intentionally devises113 and implements a course of
action or intervention aimed at bringing about or altering a specific
health-affecting behaviour.114
One reason for preferring a choice environment which has not been
deliberately constructed (at the hand of any particular person ororganisa-
tion) is because it might make it more likely, as White thinks, that we will
‘make choices that reflect [our] true interests’.115 One mistake in this
respect would be to equate ‘random’ with ‘no effect’ (which I am not sug-
gesting that White himself makes). Countless influences on our lives and
decisions might have haphazard and unintentional origins, but their non-
deliberate nature does not imply that they have no (health) behaviour
effects. The impact on behaviour might well be less marked than with pur-
posive coordinated efforts, but some influence will still be exerted. None-
theless, we might think that a choice environment which is the result of
random non-guided processes gives autonomy a sporting chance in a
way that deliberately constructed ones do not. Yet it would seem to be
an open question whether or not choice architecture which is randomly
generated aids or hinders us in making choices which reflect our true inter-
ests (whatever they may be).116 Where the numerous arbitrary forces that
act on us somehow combine to nudge us in directions we would have
113 Granted it is often difficult to determine what ‘intentions’ (or indeed if there
are any) lie behind certain policies. See PG Hansen and AM Jespersen,
‘Nudge and the Manipulation of Choice: A Framework for the Responsible
Use of the Nudge Approach to Behaviour Change in Public Policy’ (2013) 1
EJRR 3. Here the authors discuss the relevance of ‘intentionality (10–11)
and argue that this imposes responsibilities upon policy-makers (23–27).
114 We might also conceive of these on a spectrum of micro to macro; forexample,
the alterations to the salad bar described earlier might be thought of as
designed at the level of the cafeteria, but is more akin to a random aspect of
choice architecture when taken in the wider context of a person’s life or the
general structure of society.
115 White, above, n 10, 111.
116 In talking of interests and preferences, I am mindful of Sunstein and Thaler’s
claim that ‘contextual influences render the very meaning of the term “prefer-
ences” unclear’ (‘Libertarian Paternalism’, 1161). However, for the purposes
of this article, I assume that it is possible to attribute persons with such things
as ‘true’ preferences and interests.
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chosen after reflective deliberation then they could serve to promote our
true interests. Conversely, insofar as they converge to push us in other
directions, they may well be detrimental to the realisation of these
interests.
One response to the foregoing is topointout, asYeungdoes, thatwhat is
at issue is the ‘conscious and deliberate attempt to shape the context in
which people make decisions’.117 Amongst other concerns with the
recent (health) policy moves, it is the overt deliberateness and explicitness
of attempts by the state to alter its citizens’ behaviour (by means which
perhaps lack transparency) which troubles some. For example, Hausman
and Welch contend that ‘an organized effort to shape choices . . .
appears to be a form of disrespectful social control’.118 Some regulatory
initiatives canbe thoughtofasbeingdeliberate in the senseofhavingapar-
ticular aim or set of aims, as well as in terms of the way in which they are
implemented and the tools chosen to do so. For example, the implemen-
tation of a piece of legislation (such as the smoking ban mentioned
earlier) can be seen as the classical example of a deliberate form of regula-
tory action by the state (and is undeniably a form of ‘social control’). The
various prescriptions or proscriptions contained in a piece of legislation
undoubtedly form part of the choice architecture which surrounds us
and, as is its purpose, alters or controls to a more or less successful
extent the behaviour of its target institutions or individuals. However,
not all choice architecture which could be attributed to the state can be
construed as deliberately designed. Some elements in this regard may
not be the result of any purposeful coordinated effort at influencing the
decision-making of its citizens and, as such, could be understood as
random (or if not random per se, cannot be seen as having just one aim
or well demarcated set of aims). If we think about it in terms of policy-
driven regulatory attempts, we can see that this is because a multitude
of different factors might all have contributed to the drafting and imple-
mentation of a particular policy (or set of policies), the result of which
means no singular purpose can be attributed to it; for example, the need
for political compromise. Some recent forms of soft regulation, using
tools such as nudges, may be seen as deliberate, yet with regard to system-
atic efforts to shape choices by drawing on the behavioural sciences, gov-
ernment, regulators, and policy-makers are relatively late to the party:
‘our social environment is already manipulated by the private sector to
promote unhealthy choices for their own commercial ends’.119 The
more focused and organised efforts of private industry and a variety of
117 Yeung, above, n 72, 129 [emphasis added].
118 Hausman and Welch, above, n 10, 134.
119 A Carter and W Hall, ‘Avoiding Selective Ethical Objections to Nudges’
(2012) 12 Am J Bioethics 12, 13. I say behavioural science orientated efforts
612 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2013]
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/m
edlaw
/article-abstract/21/4/588/1016571 by U
niversity of Birm
ingham
 user on 17 M
ay 2020
corporate bodies could be seen as more akin to intentional design (in this
respect, it may be thought to be generally easier to discern the purpose of
private industry, e.g., to maximise profits).120 An example touched upon
in this paper already is the layout of supermarkets. Adrian Carter and
Wayne Hall point out how the placement of different foodstuffs is used
to encourage sales of particular items:
Everyday products such as milk and bread are placed at the back of
the store so that customers must walk past more discretionary food
items, increasing the chances of purchasing them, while items high
in sugar and fat are located at the checkout to promote impulse
buying.121
Another example of commercial interests at work is the tobacco industry
which uses ‘role models’ and branded packaging to try and increase the
attractiveness of its products; ‘there is evidence suggesting that tobacco
companies’ efforts to associate themselves with positive images are effect-
ive in mitigating the impact of health warnings’.122 Thus, government and
agents of the state, such as regulators and policy-makers, are not alone in
trying to influence behaviour. Private industry and corporate actors are
experts in this respect, but with detrimental effects on health:
[They] manipulate behaviour in ways that maximize the consump-
tion of harmful products and increase the incidence of significant per-
sonal and social harm, such as obesity, hypertension, cancer,
violence, and addiction.123
Given the pervasiveness of corporate influences, arguments that deny that
it is legitimate for government to enter this arena are akin to according
some sort of moral priority to the status quo; that is, to permitting
private industry and corporate actors to have a relatively free reign in
their attempts to influence our (health) behaviour. If we are worried
herebecause, asalreadynotedearlier, in somesenseall governmentpolicy is an
attempt to influence behaviour one way or the other.
120 Thank you to John Coggon for helping to clarify my thoughts in this section.
121 Ibid [emphasis in original].
122 A Alemanno, ‘Nudging Smokers:The BehaviouralTurn ofTobacco Risk Regu-
lation’ (2012) 1 EJRR 32, 36. See also G Lowenstein, ‘Out of Control: Visceral
InfluencesonBehavior’ (1996)65OrganBehaveHumDec272; JDHansonand
DA Kysar, ‘Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Ma-
nipulation’ (1999) 112 Harvard Law Rev 1420. In 2012, the UK government
conducted a consultation on removing all branding from cigarette packets.
See ,http://consultations.dh.gov.uk/tobacco/standar dised-packaging-of-
tobacco-products/consult_view. last accessed 16May 2013.Seealsoa system-
atic review that was commissioned by the government on the impact of using
plain packaging ,http://phrc.lshtm.ac.uk/papers/PHRC_006_Final_Report.
pdf. last accessed 2 July 2013.
123 Carter and Hall, above n 119, 13.
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about nudges and other behavioural influences, then we ought not
to display ‘a selective concern about the ethics of governmental
nudges’.124 In saying this, however, we should note that such selectivity
is relatively easily addressed if one is not an extreme libertarian. One
could deny that arguments against government policy aimed at altering
its citizens’ behaviour are tantamount to support for private industry to
be permitted a free hand in the matter. Instead, one could argue that the
current wrongs perpetuated by certain private sector organisations
ought not to be added to by allowing policy-makers to do the same. But
whatever we think about the government employing nudge policies them-
selves, they do not have to accord moral priority to corporate actors in this
respect. It is not incumbent upon them to sit back in silence while private
enterprise manipulates our preferences, choices, and decision-making.
Rather the solution is to regulate the corporate sector more tightly and ap-
propriately with respect to products which are health-affecting.125
Yet even if it is the case that tighter regulation is needed, this still leaves
us with the problem of the effects of all manner of other random nudges
and influences. As I argued earlier, it is an open question whether choice
architecture which is random as opposed to designed can do any better
at promoting our true preferences or interests (this and the relevant
relationship to autonomy being what some are concerned about). If,
however, nudge-type interventions are shown to be genuinely effective
in the applied setting,126 this would give us reason to think that deliberate-
ly designed nudges could promote our interests as autonomous persons
more effectively than a random assortment of influences. Nevertheless,
because of the mechanism of action by which a nudge works, there are
still reasonswhy theymightbemoreethicallyworrisome than instruments
of command and control regulation such as outright bans. Integral to
some objections regarding the introduction of tools such as nudges to
our regulatory arsenal is that they seem to be aimed at controlling behav-
iour in realmswhich have traditionallybeen thought ofas properlysubject
to individual choice (as demonstrated by the health arena where much of
the focus is on influencing various ‘lifestyle’ decisions). Some authors are
concerned about the fact that (some) nudges work by by-passing our ra-
tional processes. One thing, however, that is apparent from what has
been said in this article thus far is that there are many sorts of influences
124 Ibid.
125 There is, of course, an issue of legitimacy with strategies such as the responsi-
bility deal in relation to alcohol outlined earlier in this article. Where the gov-
ernment uses corporate actors as intermediaries in order to execute their
public policy measures, the public/private distinction becomes blurry. Ques-
tions need to be asked about the appropriateness of private actors essentially
acting as state regulators. Thank you to Elen Stokes for this point.
126 More will be said on this in the concluding section.
614 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2013]
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/m
edlaw
/article-abstract/21/4/588/1016571 by U
niversity of Birm
ingham
 user on 17 M
ay 2020
from a multitude of sources that by-pass our rational processes on a daily
basis. In section 3A, I argued that a certain level of non-autonomous func-
tioning is probably desirable. Nonetheless, a particular concern that has
been raised in the literature which warrants some attention is the claim
that, in the longer term, nudges may lead to infantilisation and a decrease
in individual responsibility. We saw earlier, for example, that Hausman
and Welch think that ‘exploiting decision-making foibles will ultimately
diminish people’s autonomous decision-making capacities’.127 While,
in a similar vein, White argues that nudging relieves people of ‘responsibil-
ity for making these choices, and with the result that cognitive biases are
accommodated rather than reduced or corrected’.128 Contrary to this,
however, I suggest rather than leading to diminished decision-making
capacities, as I am about to argue, it may in fact help to bolster them.
Studies suggest that individuals only have limited reserves of self-
control and willpower (termed ego depletion); ‘if you have had to force
yourself to do something, you are less willing or less able to exert
self-control when the next challenge comes around’.129 A potentially
health-affecting food-related example can be seen in an experiment
where participants are given a mentally complex task to undertake.
Here it was found that performance on the task was worse in those who
earlier in the experiment had to resist eating more tempting foods such
as chocolate and instead ate ‘virtuous foods such as radishes and
celery’.130 According to Kahneman, the list of tasks known to be depleting
includes ‘making a series of choices that involve conflict, trying to impress
others, [and] responding kindly to a partner’s bad behaviour’.131 The
reason why this matters and is important for the argument at hand is
that it has also been shown that depletion can have a range of effects on
subsequent decision-making; for example, ‘deviating from one’s diet,
overspending on impulsive purchases, reacting aggressively to provoca-
tion, . . . [and] performing poorly in cognitive tasks and logical decision-
making’.132 Further, linked to the idea of ego depletion is that of cognitive
busyness: ‘[p]eople who are cognitively busy are . . . more likely to make
127 Ibid.
128 White, above, n 10, 110.
129 See Kahneman, above, n 54, 41–2. For an overview article of some of the
studies and research in the area, see RF Baumeister and KD Vohs, Self-
Regulation, Ego Depletion, and Motivation (2007) 1 Soc Personal Psychol
Compass 115.
130 Kahneman, above, n 54, at 42. Of course while foods themselves cannot really
be said to be ‘virtuous’, ‘bad’, or the like, our behaviour over time with respect
tocertain typesof foodsmightmean that theyarebetterorworse forourhealth
and well-being.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
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selfish choices, use sexist language, and make superficial judgments in
social situations’.133
If all of this is correct, then it may have substantive implications for
persons as they go about their lives. Often we lead hectic and tiring lives
and when our cognitive capacities have been depleted, or our efforts are
being taken up with a multitude of tasks, we are not going to be operating
at our optimal decision-making capacity. Consequently, it is plausible to
think that our cognitive reserves ought not to be exhausted simply in the
everyday struggle to cope with the vagaries of life. If this is the case,
then some decisions must be made about where our efforts are best direc-
ted. If particular classes of decisions and choices were made easier to
get ‘right’, this would free up our decision-making faculties for other
perhaps more important decisions. For example, when we approach the
food bar in our workplace cafeteria, as we have already seen, its layout
may nudge us towards certain food choices. Where the food is laid out
in a manner that nudges us towards the healthier food options, it is con-
ceivable that we would exert less cognitive effort in resisting the not so
healthy ones. If this is correct, then our cognitive reserves are preserved
for other (classes of) decisions we might need to make in the course of
our day. Generalising this to action at state level, if we think it is a legitim-
ate goal of government to safeguard, and indeed promote, the health of its
citizens, the use of health-affecting nudges could help not only to achieve
the desired health ends, but give citizens more cognitive space in general.
There is, after all, something to be said for ‘freeing individuals from other
irrelevant influences’.134 The consequence of this would be that, far from
actually leading to infantilisation, certain well-judged nudges or other
applications of behavioural research could actually aid us, with the
right environmental support, in becoming more sophisticated and au-
tonomous moral thinkers and actors.135 This argument does, of course,
mean that we need to decide which categories of decisions and choices it
is legitimate for the state to influence. The difficulty this then raises is
whether the ends and interests of the nudger and the nudgee are appropri-
ately aligned. There is a line to be drawn between what ought and ought
not to be out of bounds (in terms of the regulation of the health of citizens)
133 Ibid at 41.
134 Hausman and Welch, above, n 10, 134.
135 Amore complexworry, which requires furtherexploration,mightbe that indi-
viduals might fare worse when taken out of the contexts which are supportive
or facilitative of certain aspects of their decision-making; that is, they will not
learn to resist influences in more hostile choice environments. Thank you to
Kalle Grill for this point. For a discussion of revealed versus normative
(‘true’) preferences and strategies which might favour one over the other see
J Beshears and others, ‘How Are Preferences Revealed?’ (2008) 92 J Pub
Econ 1787.
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for would-be governmental nudgers. Nonetheless, it does at least suggest
that nudge policy need not necessarily lead to a diminishment of individ-
ual responsibility or autonomy in decision-making.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: NUDGES AS HEALTH
POLICY INSTRUMENTS?
In this article, I have outlined recent health policy moves which aim to en-
courage and enable individuals to lead healthier lives and argued that we
can situate nudges within the set of strategies encompassed by design-
based regulation. While it is, of course, not self-evident that what is
better for health (whatever thatmightmean) is alwaysbetter forparticular
people, ‘public policy inevitably should and does attempt to objectively
evaluate better life choices’.136 Several commentators have expressed con-
cerns about behavioural-driven regulation and policy; above all, they are
concerned with the deliberate alteration and construction of our choice
environments. This article has made it clear that we cannot escape
choice architecture and, for that reason, we can view our health-affecting
decisions as already being in some sense shaped and constructed. Further,
it is not obvious that deliberately designed choice architecture is hostile
either to our true interests and ends or to leading lives as autonomous
persons. However, even if this is the case, one might respond that when
it comes to designing and implementing public policy there is an epistemic
difficulty. As White notes:
[R]egulators can never know what an agent’s true interests are
without observing her free choice or obtaining explicit consent.
Instead, designers of choice situations or default choices substitute
their own estimation of the interests of those they purport to
regulate.137
This may be correct, but even if government does not get our preferences
and interests exactly right, health-affecting nudges are at least an attempt
to guide us towards potentially justifiable ends, such as better health, well-
being, and happiness.138 A thorough-going analysis of how far they ought
to go in this respect and the exact scope of legitimate state interference is a
task for another time. However, here I have indicated that, whatever the
legitimate ends of government consist of, they do not (and in practice
136 Amir and Lobel, above, n 56, 2121.
137 White, above, n 10, 105.
138 I say ‘potentially’ because this is aclaim that would need morework to be done
in support of it since it is up for debate that these actually constitute legitimate
ends of government. I make the assumption here that, to the extent that the
government has obligations to its citizens in respect of health, these seem to
be good candidates for such ends.
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cannot) entail that the state need remain silent or agnostic on matters
affecting the health of its citizens, especially while private industry and
corporate actors carry on regardless. Further, it is entirely plausible to
think that influencing certain sets of decisions made by citizens falls
within the remit of government. Robert Frank maintains that:
Historically, the main mission of government has been not to prevent
people from making stupid decisions but to resolve collective action
problems: to provide public goods such as roads, schools, and nation-
al defense; to provide a social safety net; to protect the environment;
and so on.139
There are, however, at least two related situations in which preventing
people from making ‘stupid decisions’ could be seen as a legitimate
sphere of action for government and regulators; first, where doing so pre-
vents harm to others and, secondly, where doing so actually helps to
resolve the problems of collective action. Often health-affecting choices
do not merely have effects for the individual concerned.140 Take for
example unhealthy eating habits; say a person with a continuous diet
high in refined sugar and saturated fats. These may impact on those
around them; their family and friends if they become ill and, more import-
antly in the context of the discussion here, the state in terms of the cost of
health care or work days lost. The acceptability of state action in this case
may stem from the legitimacy of preventing higher health care and other
costs where these would mean fewer available resources for other citizens.
Secondly, this suggests that people’s choices are part of the collective
action problem. Where the decisions and choices that individual citizens
make mean that there are fewer resources in the state pot, this will have
an impact on the state’s ability to effectively pursue other goals, such as
the provision of education, safe roads, further health care, etc. Therefore,
from a pragmatic perspective, ‘if government is to deliver services such as
health care and the like, it would be desirable to avoid the waste wrought
by cognitive errors’.141 Even so, whether or not interventions such as
nudges, which aim to influence the behaviourof individuals, are appropri-
ate (and indeed efficacious) will depend on the specifics of the proposals at
hand.
139 RH Frank, ‘Review of Nudge’ (2008) 119 Ethics 202, 205.
140 M Verweij and M van den Hoven, ‘Nudges in Public Health: Paternalism Is
Paramount’ (2012) 12 AJOB 16, 16. For a similar point see Amir and Lobel,
above, n 56, 2124.
141 Schlag, above, n 16, 916. On a related note, see also Bovens who says that
‘[a]dvertisement for products that do not increase welfare may use all kinds
of Nudge style techniques and the government may be fighting a losing
battle against, say, obesity, if it cannot access the same arsenal of techniques’
(above, n 10, 218).
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As Adam Burgess remarks, ‘the choice [for government] is often
between different forms rather than between regulating or not’.142 In
this respect, we might agree with Russell Korobkin that ‘the battle to sep-
arate the economic analysis of legal rules and institutions from the
straightjacket of strict rational choice assumptions has been won’.143
Yet, it remains to be seen whether nudging will be effective as a health
policy tool. As such, there is a pragmatic empirical concern about
nudges; put simply they might not work. First, much of the behavioural
research that has been done, and that policy-makers are attempting to
draw on, has been done in controlled laboratory(-like) settings.144
Thus, the lack of empirical evidence from the applied setting is a potential
reason to doubt the efficacy of behaviour change interventions. Secondly,
some nudges may work better than others; for example, Amir and Lobel
speculate that biases which arise due to our automatic system 1 processes
may be easier to correct than ones that emanate from our more deliberate
system 2 ones.145 Thirdly, even if certain nudges and other interventions
do work, they may not be enough on their own to bring about the
desired change or to ‘solve complex policy problems’.146 As I noted in
section 2 of this article, it is probable that a range of social, economic,
and other factors influence a person’s health. Behavioural approaches
by themselves are not a panacea. Where a substantial cause of the target
health problem is due, for example, to some economic or social disadvan-
tage then a nudge may not be enough. More thorough-going and interven-
tionist measures may be required along with policies which can bring
about the requisite social change.147 Where policy-makers attempt to
do this, we must guard against what has been labelled ‘lifestyle drift’.
This is the ‘tendency for policy initiatives on tackling health inequalities
to start off with a broad recognition of the need to take action on the
wider social determinants of health (upstream), but which, in the course
of implementation, drift downstream to focus largely on individual life-
style factors’.148 Given, as outlined at the beginning of this article, that
142 Burgess, above, n 22, 11 [emphasis added].
143 R Korobkin, ‘What Comes After Victory for Behavioral Law & Economics’
(2011) U Ill L Rev 1653, 1655.
144 Yeung, above, n 72, 124, 146.
145 Amir and Lobel, above, n 56, 2110–4.
146 E Selinger and KP Whyte, ‘Nudging Cannot Solve Complex Policy Problems’
(2012) 1 EJRR 26. See alsoHouse of Lords’ Report, above, n 5; TMarteauand
others, ‘Judging Nudging: Can Nudging Improve Population Health?’ (2011)
342 BMJ 263, 265. Although as John and Richardson point out there is also a
lack of evidence about the effectiveness of other approaches (above, n 37, 26).
147 Thank you to Elen Stokes for her thoughts on this point.
148 Marmot Review Working Committee 3, Cross-cutting Sub-group Report,
Learning Lessons from the Past: Shaping a Different Future, November
2009 (available at ,http://www.instituteofhealthequity.org/projects/
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the substantive focus of Government attention regarding health-affecting
nudges is on the traditional lifestyle-focused health culprits (smoking,
diet, alcohol, etc), there is a danger that the opportunity to take a wider
systems approach is lost.149 Finally, there may be as yet unknown unin-
tended consequences which flow from implementing behaviour change
policies.150 There is, therefore, a largely unanswered question about
how such research, given the complexity of the lived environment and
the myriad of influences on our health-affecting decision-making pro-
cesses, translates into policy and regulatory initiatives. Yet, despite all
of these concerns, this does not mean we ought to abandon behavioural
approaches to regulating health. Instead, government ought to ensure
that pilot studies are properly carried out before any wholesale policy
changes are brought in.151 The state can already be viewed as being a
choice architect for its citizens’ health. The challenge that is faced, there-
fore, by its regulators and policy-makers is to exert their influence in a
manner which is not only legitimate, but also empirically robust.
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